Introduction
Game theoretical analyses of the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have stressed the difficulties in designing self-enforcing treaties because of free-riding. Two approaches can be distinguished: 1 cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The cooperative approach has focused on transfer schemes that ensure stability of the efficient grand coalition implementing a socially optimal emission or abatement vector (e.g., Chander/Tulkens 1995 and Germain et al. 2000 . The tool of the analysis is the characteristic function that assigns a worth to coalitions. The worth is the aggregate payoff to a coalition that it can secure for itself irrespective of the behavior of countries outside the coalition. Stability has been checked by invoking the concept of the core: the grand coalition is stable, that is, lies in the core, if no subgroup of countries has an incentive to form another coalition, assuming that remaining countries break up into singletons playing either a minimax, maximin or Nash equilibrium strategy.
The advantage of the cooperative approach is that theoretical results have been derived under general conditions. Moreover, the amount of empirical studies is relatively large and most rely on a sound empirical module (e.g., Eyckmans and Tulkens 1999 , Germain et al. 1998 and Kaitala et al. 1995 . The importance of this approach lies in stressing the role of the allocation of the gains from cooperation for stability and in showing how free-riding can be mitigated by a "cleverly" designed transfer scheme. However, by the nature of a normatively oriented approach, cooperative game theory contributes only to a limited extent to rationalizing inefficient IEAs, which, of course, most treaties are. Moreover, we are convinced that some conceptual drawbacks are implied by the characteristic function. First, assuming that countries pursue their self-interest as rational players, it seems natural to conclude that they will base their decision of membership on individual payoffs and not on the aggregate payoff to their coalition even if transfers are available. Second, the stability test rests on very strong assumptions about the implicit punishment after free-riding of a group of countries. Third, externalities between countries and coalitions are only insufficiently captured since the characteristic function treats all players outside a coalition as a residual that acts as a benchmark for deviations with punishment (Bloch 1997).
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The following discussion is exclusively restricted to coalition formation in the context of IEAs.
For an overview, see 2003a) . A more general discussion of cooperative and noncooperative coalition theory is provided in Bloch (1997) .
In contrast, the non-cooperative approach has focused on explaining the problems of forming large and effective coalitions. The tool of the analysis is the valuation function that assigns an individual payoff to each country for each possible partition of countries (i.e., coalition structure). For each coalition structure, payoffs follow from the assumption that coalition members jointly maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition but behave non-cooperatively towards outsiders (see section 2 for details). Equilibrium coalition structures are determined by applying the concept of internal and external stability. Internal stability means that no coalition member has an incentive to leave its coalition to become a singleton and external stability that no singleton has an incentive to join a coalition. Key results that emerge from this literature (e.g., Barrett 1994 , Bauer 1992 , Carraro/Siniscalco 1993 , Hoel 1992 , Hoel/Schneider 1997 Jeppesen/Andersen 1998 and Rubio/Ulph 2001 are: a) only small coalitions are stable and b) whenever full cooperation (social optimum) would generate large global welfare gains compared to no cooperation (Nash equilibrium), stable coalitions achieve only little.
The advantage of the non-cooperative approach is that it helps to explain the problems of cooperation in international pollution control in the sense of a positive analysis. The reason is that it better captures spillovers across countries and coalitions, and that punishment after a deviation rests on a more plausible assumption: after a country leaves the agreement the residual signatories remain in it, though they revise their abatement strategies. A conceptual drawback of this approach is that most results rely on simulations and have been derived for very specific assumptions. Typical assumptions include a static payoff structure, symmetric players, and in the case of heterogeneous countries a particular form of heterogeneity.
Moreover, there are only few empirical studies and most compromise either on the dynamics (e.g., Botteon/Carraro 1997 and Tol 2001 or on the regional disaggregation of the climate problem (i.e., number of players; e.g., Bosello et al. 2001 , Buchner et al., Eyckmans/Finus 2003 .
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap -at least partially, though, admittedly, our empirical module of the model is not a fully-fledged general equilibrium model. Nevertheless, we believe that our model improves upon previous work in two respects. First, our model captures important features of the dynamic nature of greenhouse gas concentration. Second, the analysis comprises twelve world regions that render the interaction between actors more interesting than studies that consider only few regions.
In the following, we lay out the game theoretical part of the model in section 2 and the empirical part in section 3. In section 4, we discuss ecological and welfare aspects of coalition formation of our base case and in section 5 we report on results of various sensitivity analyses. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes with some remarks about future research issues. In section 3, we will lay out in detail how global abatement relates to global emissions and greenhouse gas concentration and how this affects payoffs. At this stage, it suffices to note that we follow the standard assumption of the valuation function approach and presume that countries belonging to the same coalition maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition (Bloch 1997 Then, the singleton coalition structure forms that is internally stable by definition and externally stable because no other coalition can be induced by a change of a single membership strategy. The last remark stresses that an I&E-CS is de facto a Nash equilibrium in the announcement game formalized in Definition 1. Finally note that in the context of our empirical model a necessary condition for an internally stable coalition structure is that the condition of individual rationality is met (see Appendix 1 for a proof). That is, all signatories must receive a higher payoff than in the singleton coalition structure. Hence, if this condition i 0 σ = is violated for at least one signatory, we can immediately conclude that this coalition structure cannot be internally stable.
Theoretical Background of the Model
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Empirical Background of the Model
Introduction
In this section, we describe the calibration of payoff function [1] . The philosophy behind the construction of our empirical model comprises two items. First, the model must be simple enough to be tractable for a game theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, it should reflect important results and features of general equilibrium models in terms of the development of global emissions and concentration over some period. Therefore, we base our calibration in this respect on the widely known DICE-model by Nordhaus (1994) . Second, in order to make the model interesting for a game theoretic analysis, there should be a sufficient amount of different players. We consider twelve world regions. Since this requires disaggregate information on benefit and abatement cost functions we rely on damage cost estimates of Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1997) and abatement cost estimates of Ellerman/Decaux (1998) . From the nature of the two items, it is apparent that we have to seek a compromise. Hence, we set up an empirical model that we call stability of coalition model, henceforth abbreviated STACO.
STACO captures important dynamic aspects of climate change but is de facto a finitely repeated game with stationary abatement strategies.
In the following, we proceed in five steps. First, we describe the relation between emissions and concentration. Second, we discuss damages implied by concentration. Third, we show how we derive benefit functions from damage cost functions. Fourth, we report about the calibration of the abatement cost functions. Fifth, we discuss the implications of the first four steps for our payoff function and computations of valuations for different coalition structures.
All parameters are reported in the Appendix 2; a detailed description of the model is available from the authors upon request (Dellink et al. 2003) .
Emissions and Concentration
In our analysis, we focus on carbon dioxide, but the exogenous level of other greenhouse gases is included in the calibration of the damage cost function (Nordhaus 1994) . For the development of emissions and the stock of carbon dioxide in the business-as-usual-scenario (BAU), we base our calibration on the market scenario in DICE. This scenario assumes no emission reduction, though there is a feedback between the environment and the economy. In DICE, global emissions grow non-constantly over time. However, it turns out that a linear specification of uncontrolled global emissions (e t ) provides a good fit for the development of the stock of carbon dioxide: The stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at time t is expressed in the standard way by the following equation: 
Global Damage Cost Function
In DICE global damages depend on world temperature increase, t T ∆ , global GDP, , and parameter that measures the impact on GDP due to an increase in temperature of 3
degrees Celsius compared to the pre-industrial level.
However, in order to establish a direct link between concentration and damages, we follow
Germain and Van Steenberghe (2001), who use the following approximation of the full climate module:
where η is a parameter. Substituting [7] into [6], gives: 
Though this damage function is non-linear, it can be approximated by a linear function in the relevant range of our study, that is, between the stock in 2010 (1.4 times pre-industrial level) and the estimated uncontrolled level in 2110 (3.5 times pre-industrial level):
[10] 
Derivation of Global and Regional Benefit Functions
Since we prefer to compute payoffs in terms of net benefits and not in terms of total costs, we express benefits in the form of reduced damages due to abatement. Due to the assumption of stationary abatement strategies, we can express benefits in year t as a function of total abatement over the entire period, q . Noting that [11] reads
which indicates that the intercept has no effect on the benefit function. Summing over all periods, discounting benefits with a discount rate of 2 percent, inserting from above gives total benefits T 
). This figure is in line with results by Plambeck and Hope (1996) who 3 All market values are expressed in billion US$ of 1985 using the deflator provided by NASA (2002) . This applies to damages, benefits and abatement costs.
report that their best estimates of marginal global benefits in a regional scenario fall within the range of 10 to 48 US$ per ton CO 2 . 
The allocation is a difficult task since no source of damage cost estimates is available that exactly matches with our regions. However, two sources come relatively close to our regional specification: Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1997 
Derivation of Abatement Cost Functions
For the specification of the abatement cost function, we rely on estimates of the EPPA model that are reported in Ellerman and Decaux (1998) . They assume an annual abatement cost function of the following form: words, in our model no leakage effects occur. According to theory (Carraro/Siniscalco 1998 and Finus 2003a) , this is the most favorable condition for forming stable coalitions.
Nevertheless, as will be apparent from subsequent sections, cooperation proves very difficult. Table 2 reports results if each region forms its own coalition that corresponds to the "classical" Nash equilibrium with no cooperation. Hence, marginal abatement costs are equal to marginal benefits for each country. Annual global emission reduction amounts to only 4.6 percent that implies a stock of carbon dioxide of 1,561 gigatons of CO 2 in 2110. This is about 2.5 times the pre-industrial level. The fact that benefits are rather high compared to costs from abatement explains that even in the absence of any cooperation total emission reductions exceed that in the BAU-scenario (no abatement) by 55 gigatons. Global stock of carbon dioxide by 2110 = 1,561 Gton
Singleton Coalition Structure
At the level of individual regions, it is evident that annual emission reductions vary widely.
The reason is large differences in marginal abatement cost curves (see Figure 1 and Table 1, section 3) and marginal benefits from abatement (see Table 1 , section 3) between regions. For instance, USA has a relatively flat marginal abatement cost curve but high marginal benefits from abatement. Thus, even in the absence of cooperation, USA has an incentive to annually reduce emissions by 6.7 percentage. A similar argument applies to CHN that has an even flatter marginal abatement cost curve, though lower marginal benefits from abatement compared to USA. In contrast, regions like BRA, DAE, EEX have virtually no incentive at all to conduct emission reductions by itself because of steep marginal abatement cost curves and low marginal benefits from abatement. Overall, it is evident that marginal benefits and costs remain at a moderate level. Table 3 displays results for the grand coalition structure that corresponds to the "classical" global or social optimum with full cooperation. Thus, marginal abatement costs are equal across countries and amount to 37.4 US$/ton -a value that is in the range of many other empirical studies (e.g., Weyant 1999) . At the aggregate level, annual emission reduction amounts to 21.4 percent, exceeding those in the singleton coalition structure by a substantial amount. Nevertheless, the effect on concentrations in 2110 is only moderate -a feature reminiscent also to most computable general equilibrium models: it amounts to a reduction of only 5.5 percentage compared to the singleton coalition structure. The reason is that the airborne fraction of CO 2 -emissions that remains in the atmosphere is only 64 percent and the annual natural removal rate of 0.86 percent levels off differences between both scenarios over a period of 100 years. However, the total payoff (benefits minus abatement costs) in the grand coalition structure is 6031 billion US$, which implies a gain from cooperation of 208 percent compared to the singleton coalition structure. This stresses the importance of cooperation in the case of global warming. At the level of individual regions, it is evident that CHN, USA and IND have to contribute substantial more than other regions to a globally optimal solution due to their flat marginal abatement cost curves. For EET and CHN a globally optimal solution would not be individually rational since these regions would loose compared to the Nash equilibrium as it is indicated by bold faced figures in column 6, Table 3 . Those regions have to contribute much to cooperation but benefit only little in the form of reduced damages. Thus, we can immediately conclude that the grand coalition is not a stable coalition structure. Moreover, a more detailed analysis conducted in the last column of Table 3 reveals that all regions, except JPN and EEC, have an incentive to leave the grand coalition. Considering the absolute amount of the gains from leaving the grand coalition indicates that most regions face a strong free-rider incentive. Only JPN and EEC have no interest in leaving the grand coalition.
Grand Coalition Structure
However, not only these two regions have the highest interest in full cooperation but -as will be apparent below -also in partial cooperation. A detailed explanation of the underlying fundamentals will be provided below where we report on our stability analysis (subsection 4.5). Table 4 ) jointly maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition and therefore marginal abatement costs of these regions are equal. Even though half of the regions form a coalition, annual abatement is substantially lower than in the global optimum but almost twice as high as in the Nash equilibrium. Also, the global gain from cooperation is with 3140 bln US$ 60 percent higher than in the Nash equilibrium. Global stock of carbon dioxide by 2110 = 1,539 Gton
Kyoto Coalition Structure
However, also the Kyoto coalition structure is not stable. Three regions, OOE, EET and FSU, would be worse off in this coalition than in the Nash equilibrium (as indicated by bold faced numbers in Table 4 , column 5). Moreover, not only these regions but also the USA have an incentive to leave the coalition, as it is evident from the last column in Table 4 . 6 This result together with our finding that the USA will already conduct relative high abatement without any cooperation (see Table 2 ) helps to explain the decision of President Bush to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol and his announcement to pursue, nevertheless, an "active" national climate policy.
6
The finding that the Kyoto coalition is neither individually rational nor internal stable is also confirmed by Bosello et al. (2001) .
Not surprising, all six outsiders are better off than in the Nash equilibrium since they benefit from the abatement efforts of the Kyoto coalition. The fact that none of the outsiders has an incentive to join the coalition is more surprising, which follows from the negative number in the last column in Table 4 . The reason is that if already six regions have formed a coalition, joining would imply a substantial increase of abatement efforts for a potential entrant but only a marginal additional benefit from reduced emissions.
Stability Analysis
We checked all 4084 coalition structures for internal and external stability with an algorithm programmed with the software package Matlab. We found no non-trivial coalition structure that is internally and externally stable at the same time. 7 Whereas more than 1000 coalition structures are externally stable, only 14 coalition structures are internally stable. Thus, the main problem for cooperation is internal stability because of strong free-rider incentives to leave a coalition. In order to shed light on this fundamental problem for cooperation, we compute first a free-rider incentive index and then have a closer look at internally stable coalition structures that are displayed in Table 5 .
The aim of the free-rider incentive index is to capture the general incentive to participate in cooperation and to explain membership of internally stable coalition structures. The assumptions of the valuation function (see Definition 2) suggest to construct an index related to the benefits and costs of joint abatement. Therefore, we define the index as annual percentage emission reduction in the social optimum in region i (column 3, Table 3 ) divided by marginal benefits from abatement in the Nash equilibrium in region i (last column in table   2 ). The numerator captures the incentive of a country to join a coalition in terms of its contribution to joint abatement. The higher this value, the more has a region to contribute to joint abatement, and hence the lower is the incentive to cooperate. The denominator captures the incentive of a country to join a coalition in terms of its individual benefits from joint abatement. The higher the value, the more does a region benefit from joint abatement and hence the higher is the incentive to cooperate. Taken together, by construction of this index, a low value indicates a low free-rider incentive and a high value a high free-rider incentive. Of course, this index can only be a crude measure of the "average incentive structure" given that there are 4084 different coalition structures. In order to ease comparison, we express free-7 A non-trivial coalition structure includes a coalition with at least two members. In the following, we concentrate in the stability analysis on these coalition structures since the singleton coalition structure is stable by definition. See section 2.
rider incentives in relative terms and set the highest free-rider incentive to 100 percent. It is evident that EET has the highest free-rider incentive, followed by DAE, IND and CHN.
In contrast, JPN has the lowest free-rider incentive followed by EEC and USA. However, not only the absolute value of the free-rider incentive matters but also the relative distance between values, as it is evident from Table 5 . Though JPN, EEC and USA have a low free-rider incentive, they are not members of an internally stable coalition. All three countries have an incentive in cooperation because of relatively high marginal benefits. Moreover, they have a strong incentive to form a coalition for instance with CHN because of her flat marginal abatement cost curve. However, such a coalition would not be internally stable because it violates the interests of CHN. Also, EET is no member of an internally stable coalition because its free-rider index is far above average.
Thus, only countries with a similar incentive structure form internally stable coalitions.
Results: Sensitivity Analyses
A typical feature of empirical work is that results depend on parameter values, which are subject to some uncertainty. Given the large number of parameters that enter our model, some selection is necessary for sensitivity analyses. As indicated in section 3, we believe that the highest uncertainty concerns benefits from global abatement in terms of absolute and regional values. Hence, we conduct two sets of sensitivity analyses. The first set continues to assume shares in global benefits of the base case (Calibration I) but uniformly lowers or raises the level of benefits from global abatement. That is, we change the base value of . The second set assumes different shares of benefits, namely those listed in Table 1, 
First Set of Sensitivity Analyses (Calibration I)
We start by lowering global benefits by 50 percent compared to the base case that implies D 0.0135 γ = instead of D 0.027 γ = , which is almost the value of Nordhaus (1994) . We find no stable (non-trivial) coalition structure in this case as indicated in Table 6 . Subsequently, we raise benefits gradually. This leads to a stable coalition between JPN and EEC at a level of 120 percent. Interestingly, in this case, internally stable coalition structures are exactly those listed in Table 5 , except that JPN and EEC also form an internally stable coalition, which is also externally stable. Recalling our discussion in section 4, this is not surprising. First, in the grand and the Kyoto coalition structures these were the only two regions that had no incentive to leave their coalition (see Tables 3 and 4) . Second, JPN and EEC had the lowest free-rider incentive with a similar value (see subsection 4.5). 8 However, the coalition of JPN and EEC only marginally improves upon the singleton coalition structure as is evident from Table 6 .
Not only that a coalition of only two regions implies that there are ten free-riders, a coalition of two regions with a low free-rider incentive index chooses only very moderate abatement targets (because marginal abatement costs are relatively high compared to marginal benefits).
We also compute scenarios where we raise benefits to 200 and 300 percent, respectively, but no major changes occur. Though absolute values of the numbers in Table 6 increase, relative differences remain almost the same. In addition, only a coalition of JPN and EEC is stable for these cases that only marginally improves upon the non-cooperative case but falls substantially short of the full cooperative case.
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The values computed in subsection 4.5 change only marginally when increasing damages to a level of 120 percent since also annual percentages of emission reduction increase in a similar range. In fact, the difference in values of the free-rider incentive index of JPN and EEC becomes even smaller. All results are perfectly in line with theory (see 2003a for an overview and the literature cited there). First, if there are stable coalitions they will be rather small. Second, coalitions will be of equal or smaller size in the case of heterogeneous regions than in the case of symmetric regions. In our empirical context with heterogeneous incentives, only a coalition of at most two regions is stable. In contrast, assuming symmetric parameter values for our specification of the payoff function, we find that the maximum stable coalition structure comprises three regions. Third, whenever the relative difference between no cooperation and full cooperation is large, stable coalitions (partial cooperation) achieve only little. For all scenarios, the global payoff in the Nash equilibrium is roughly one third of that in the social optimum -a large difference -and a stable coalition closes this gap only by a very small amount. Interestingly, the ratio between Nash equilibrium and social optimum in terms of global payoff rises slightly from 30.6 percent in the 50% benefit scenario to 32.9 percent in the 120% benefit scenario, reaching 35.9 percent in the 300% benefit scenario. Thus, when the difference between no and full cooperation is particularly pronounced no stable (nontrivial) coalition exists. Only if this difference becomes small enough, partial cooperation is stable.
Second Set of Sensitivity Analyses (Calibration II)
Here we assume the level of global benefits at 100 percent as in the base case but consider different regional shares of benefits, as listed in Table 1 under Calibration II. For this run, we find the results displayed in Table 7 . From Table 7 (together with further background information) three important conclusions emerge that confirm previous findings. First, the difference between no cooperation and full cooperation is large. However, the grand coalition is not stable. Second, the Kyoto coalition structure is clearly inferior to full cooperation but would improve quite considerably upon no cooperation. However, this coalition is also not stable since all participants except JPN would have an incentive to leave this coalition. Third, the only stable coalition is formed by JPN, BRA and ROW that only marginally improves upon the Nash equilibrium. 9 Computing the free-rider incentive for Calibration II in the spirit outlined in section 4 reveals that this result can easily be rationalized. These three regions have by far the lowest free-rider incentive and a similar index value. This explains not only membership in this coalition but also why this coalition does not contribute much in solving the global warming problem. The result also stresses that the conjecture, those regions, which form a coalition, are the 'good guys' and those, which stay outside a coalition, are the 'bad guys', would be premature. From a game theoretic perspective, we can only conclude that regions forming a coalition have a low and similar free-rider incentive. For instance, in this example, the signatories JPN and BRA reduce emissions on average by 3 and 2.6 percent, respectively, whereas the outsiders USA and IND reduce emissions by 4.6 percent and 12 percent, respectively. 
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we studied stability of climate change coalitions in a cartel formation game, Finus/Rundshagen (1998) and Finus (2003b) . Third, the definition of external stability implies that regions can join coalitions at their free will. From a public choice perspective, however, one may suspect that current members of a treaty decide on accession by majority or unanimity vote. We suspect that this leads to more stability and cooperation.
Appendix 1
In section 2, we claim that a necessary condition for internal stability in our model is that each signatory receives more than in the singleton coalition structure. that region i is a member of coalition c in coalition structure c but not in coalition structures c´ and c´´. Of course, the first inequality sign is only a restatement of the condition of internal stability and hence we only have to prove the second inequality sign. We do so by showing that if some regions form coalition c , region i will be better off than in the singleton coalition structure (Finus/Rundshagen 2003) . 
